Optimizely Breach Hit 178 Companies Including Zoom, Salesforce, and HSBC
Malicious code slipped into websites through the Optimizely platform, hitting 178 organizations. It swapped crypto wallet addresses and skimmed payment cards.

One Vendor, 178 Victims
The Optimizely data breach surfaced on Tuesday, November 17, and it is a textbook supply-chain attack. Malicious code got into websites not by hacking each site individually, but by slipping into Optimizely, the website optimization platform those sites all use. Security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI found the infection and reported that 178 organizations were affected, including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Ledger, and Peacock. Shares of several of the named companies dipped on the news.
The mechanism is what makes this breach important. Optimizely lets companies run A/B tests and personalization by loading a snippet of JavaScript on their pages. When attackers compromised that pipeline, their code rode along on every site that trusted the snippet. Visitors to household-name websites were running attacker code in their browsers without any of those sites being hacked directly. That is the supply-chain nightmare in one sentence: your security is only as strong as your vendors' security, and you do not get a vote on theirs.
What the Malware Actually Did
According to Helme, the injected code was a multi-purpose kit, not a single trick. It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's own, so anyone copying a wallet address from an infected page would send funds to the wrong place. It skimmed payment card details entered on infected pages. It stole browser cookies and took screenshots. And on iPhones and iPads, it delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits, which are built to compromise mobile devices.
The breadth of that toolkit tells you the attackers were not after one company's data. They wanted whatever they could get from the combined traffic of 178 major sites: money, credentials, sessions, and device access. A crypto wallet swap is the kind of theft victims often do not notice until the funds are gone, because the address on screen looks almost identical to the real one.
Optimizely confirmed the incident and moved to delete the malicious code from its platform. Helme confirmed the cleanup was working: when he checked at 21:52 UTC, only one of the 188 infected snippets was still present. That is a fast response, but the exposure window matters more than the cleanup speed. The code was live on major websites, and anyone who visited those sites, entered payment details, or copied a wallet address during the window may be affected.
The Supply-Chain Lesson, Again
This is the third major supply-chain breach to hit the news in a matter of days, and the pattern is becoming the story of late 2026. Infoblox confirmed an intrusion through a third-party data migration vendor on November 16, with employee Social Security numbers and direct deposit details exposed. Expedia disclosed a breach that came through a third-party vendor, and SEGA confirmed 2.19 million email addresses leaked through a newsletter vendor. The front door keeps holding. The side doors keep opening.
The uncomfortable truth is that modern websites are assemblies of dozens of third-party scripts: analytics, chat widgets, payment processors, A/B testing tools, and ad networks. Each one runs with the same privileges as the site's own code. Most companies audit their own code carefully and their vendors' code barely at all. A compromised snippet on a trusted platform is worth more to an attacker than a hundred phishing emails, because it arrives pre-approved by the site itself.
For a deeper look at how these vendor breaches keep happening, read our coverage of the Infoblox supply-chain breach, the Expedia breach through a third-party vendor, and the SEGA breach via a newsletter vendor.
What to Do If You Visited an Affected Site
If you visited Zoom, Salesforce, HSBC, Equifax, Ledger, Peacock, IKEA, the BBC, or CNN recently and did anything involving money or logins, take a few minutes to protect yourself. Check your bank and card statements for transactions you do not recognize, and do it for the next few weeks, not just today. If you copied a cryptocurrency wallet address from any website in the last few days, verify the destination before sending anything, and check past transactions against the address you intended.
Log out and log back into important accounts to invalidate any stolen session cookies, and turn on two-factor authentication anywhere it is still off. If you use an iPhone or iPad and visited an affected site, make sure iOS is fully updated, since the exploit kits targeted mobile browsers. None of this is fun, and none of it is the user's fault. But until websites start treating third-party scripts with the suspicion they deserve, the cleanup falls on the people who visited the sites.


